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1 Introduction
What and how many are the shocks that drive economic fluctuations? What is the relative
importance of supply and demand disturbances? What are the effects of macroeconomic
policies? These questions have been at the core of macroeconomic research for more than
half a century, since the answer is key to assessing competing theories of the business cycle
and the implied policy recommendations.
Since Sims’ (1980) seminal paper, structural vector autoregressive models (SVAR) have
been a major tool to address the questions above. Such models replaced large scale econo-
metric models, their main advantage being that they do not require the imposition of
“incredible” identifying restrictions. Over the last three decades, SVAR literature have
substantially contributed to improve our knowledge of macroeconomic dynamics, providing
evidence often used as a guideline by both policymakers and theorists. Nonetheless, we be-
lieve that SVAR models have an important limitation: the amount of information that they
can handle is perforce small, owing to the so-called “curse of dimensionality”. The relevance
of this information issue is stressed in several papers, including Quah (1990), Sims (1992),
Lippi and Reichlin (1993, 1994), Bernanke and Boivin (1993), Bernanke et al. (2005). If, as
plausible, both policy makers and private economic agents base their decisions on all of the
available macroeconomic information, structural shocks should be innovations with respect
to a large information set, perhaps larger than the one that can be included in a standard
VAR.
An alternative to SVAR models is given by a new generation of large dimensional mod-
els: the “generalized” or “approximate” dynamic factor models introduced by Forni et al.
(2000), Forni and Lippi (2001), Stock and Watson (2002a, 2002b) and recently proposed
for structural economic analysis (Stock and Watson, 2005, Forni et al., 2009). Such models
have been successful in solving well known VAR puzzles (Bernanke et al., 2005, Forni and
Gambetti, 2010). Their key advantage is that they combine a large number of macroe-
conomic variables with a reduced number of macroeconomic shocks. Two basic features
distinguish large factor models from old-fashioned large scale models. First, identification
can be reached in just the same way as in VAR models, without relying on “incredible”
restrictions. Second, the forecasting performance is good (Stock and Watson 2002a, 2002b,
Altissimo et al., 2010).
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In this paper we use a large structural factor model to address the questions raised at the
beginning of this introduction. Specifically, we apply the model and the estimation method
of Forni et al. (2009) to 101 US quarterly series, covering the period 1959-I to 2007-IV.
Following Uhlig (2005), we adopt an identification scheme based on inequality constraints.
Such constraints are milder than the traditional zero restrictions commonly used in the
VAR literature, in that only the sign of the impulse response functions at a few specific
lags is imposed. Sign restrictions are particularly appropriate in our data-rich framework,
since they can be imposed on a broad set of variables and this, in turn, is likely to deliver
a better characterization of the shocks.
As a first step in our analysis we answer the question: how many shocks are there in the
macroeconomy? This question has largely been ignored in the empirical literature, probably
because it is not meaningful within a VAR framework, where the number of economic shocks
is determined by the number of variables included in the model. We find that the US
economy can be well described by a number of shocks between 2 and 6, contrary to both
theories relying on a single source of fluctuations, like early RBC models, and models with
many macroeconomic shocks, like the one in Smets and Wouters (2007).
We then focus on a four-shock specification and identify two non-policy shocks, demand
and supply, and two policy shocks, monetary and fiscal. All shocks are normalized as
expansionary by imposing positive effects on output (GDP and industrial production). We
further impose that supply reduce prices, whereas the other three shocks raise prices (CPI
and GDP deflator). Moreover, we impose that expansionary monetary policy reduces the
federal fund rate and expansionary fiscal policy raises federal deficit.
Our main findings are the following. First, both supply and demand shocks explain a
considerable fraction of the fluctuations in real variables. However, their relative importance
depends on the specific variable considered. Supply shocks explain most of GDP volatility,
while demand shocks prevail for employment and other labor market variables. Demand
shocks are less persistent than supply shocks and their long-run effect on GDP is not
significant. Concerning inflation, both supply and demand have relevant effects; but demand
shocks prevail, particularly in the long-run.
Second, policy is important. Discretionary monetary policy shocks have sizeable effects
on output and prices and are responsible for the early 80s recession and disinflation. Dis-
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cretionary fiscal policy shocks have sizeable effects on GDP and do not have important
crowding-out effects on private consumption and investment, with the sole exception of res-
idential investment. As for systematic policy, there is evidence of a strong countercyclical
response of both monetary and fiscal authorities to demand and, to a lesser extent, supply
shocks.
Finally, negative demand shocks have a persistent positive effect on labor productivity.
This finding, while being at odds with most of the business cycle literature, is consistent
with a stream of empirical and theoretical work concerning the interactions between growth
and cycle and the Schumpeterian view of recessions as providing a cleansing mechanism for
reducing organizational inefficiencies and resource misallocations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 shows results concerning the number of shocks and presents in detail the definition of
the shocks and the identification scheme. Section 4 presents the main results. Section 5
concludes.
2 Theory
In the present section we provide a presentation of our model and estimation procedure.
For additional details see Forni, Giannone, Lippi and Reichlin (2009), FGLR from now on.
2.1 The factor model
We assume that each variable xit of our macroeconomic data set is the sum of two mutually
orthogonal unobservable components, the common component χit and the idiosyncratic
component ξit:
xit = χit + ξit. (2.1)
The idiosyncratic components are poorly correlated in the cross-sectional dimension (see
FGLR, Assumption 5 for a precise statement). They arise from shocks or sources of vari-
ation which considerably affect only a single variable or a small group of variables; in this
sense, we could say that they are not “macroeconomic” shocks. For variables related to
particular sectors, like industrial production indexes or production prices, the idiosyncratic
component may reflect sector specific variations (with a slight abuse of language we could
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say “microeconomic” fluctuations); for strictly macroeconomic variables, like GDP, invest-
ment or consumption, the idiosyncratic component must be interpreted essentially as a
measurement error.
The common components are responsible for the main bulk of the co-movements between
macroeconomic variables, being linear combinations of a relatively small number r of factors
f1t, f2t, · · · , frt, not depending on i:
χit = a1if1t + a2if2t + · · ·+ arifrt = aif t. (2.2)
The dynamic relations between the macroeconomic variables arise from the fact that the
vector f t of the common factors follows the VAR relation
f t = D1f t−1 + · · ·+Dpf t−p + t
t = Rut,
(2.3)
where R is a r×q matrix and ut = (u1t u2t · · · uqt)′ is a q-dimensional vector of orthonormal
white noises, with q ≤ r. Such white noises are the “common” or “primitive” shocks or
“dynamic factors” (whereas the entries of f t are the “static factors”).
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From equations (2.1) to (2.3) it is seen that the model can be written in the dynamic
form
xit = bi(L)ut + ξit, (2.4)
where
bi(L) = ai(I −D1L− · · · −DpLp)−1R. (2.5)
The dynamic factors ut and bi(L) are “structural” macroeconomic shocks and impulse-
response functions respectively.2
1Observe that, if q < r, the residuals of the above VAR relation have a singular variance covariance
matrix. Equations (2.1) to (2.3) need further qualification to ensure that all of the factors are loaded, so
to speak, by enough variables with large enough loadings (see FGLR, Assumption 4); this “pervasiveness”
condition is necessary to have uniqueness of the common and the idiosyncratic components, as well as the
number of static factors r and dynamic factors q.
2Unlike the dynamic factors, the static factors do not have a structural economic interpretation; rather,
they are a statistical tool which is useful to model the dynamics of the system. Loosely speaking, given
the number of primitive shocks q, the number of “static factors” r governs the “degree of heterogeneity”
of the impulse-response functions. For instance, in the simple case q = 1, if r = 1 all the impulse-response
functions are proportional. On the other hand, if r is larger, different variables can load the shock with
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2.2 Identification
Representation (2.4) is not unique, since the impulse-response functions and the related
primitive shocks are not identified. In particular, if H is any orthogonal q× q matrix, then
Rut in (2.3) is equal to Svt, where S = RH
′ and vt = Hut, so that χit = ci(L)vt, with
ci(L) = bi(L)H
′ = ai(I −D1L− · · · −DpLp)−1S. However, assuming mutually orthogonal
structural shocks, post-multiplication by H ′ is the only admissible transformation, i.e. the
impulse-response functions are unique up to orthogonal transformations, just like in struc-
tural VAR models (FGLR, Proposition 2). As a consequence, structural analysis in factor
models can be carried on along lines very similar to those of standard SVAR analysis.
To be precise, let us assume that economic theory implies a set of restrictions on the
impulse-response functions of some variables, the first m ≤ n with no loss of generality. Let
us write such functions in matrix notation as Bm(L) = (b1(L)
′b2(L)′ · · · bm(L)′)′. Given any
non-structural representation
χmt = Cm(L)vt, (2.6)
along with the relation
Bm(L) = Cm(L)H, (2.7)
if theory-based restrictions on Bm(L) are sufficient to obtain H, then bi(L) is uniquely
determined for any i (just identification).
In the present paper however we do not identify uniquely the shocks and the impulse-
response functions; rather, following Uhlig (2005), we identify a distribution of shocks and
related impulse-response functions by imposing a set of sign restrictions on the impulse-
response functions themselves. Formally, let bik be the coefficient of the term of degree k
of bi(L). We impose bik > 0 for i ∈ I, k ∈ K and bjh < 0 for j ∈ J , h ∈ H, where I, K,
J and H are sets of integers. The precise set of restrictions that we impose in the present
paper is discussed below.
A quite natural parameterization of the orthogonal matrices H is given by the hyper-
spherical coordinates of the unit sphere Sw of dimension w = (q2 − q)/2, i.e. H = H(θ), θ
being a w-dimensional vector of angles such that 0 ≤ θj < pi, j = 1, . . . , w−1, 0 ≤ θw < 2pi.
different delays, so that we may have leading, coincident and lagging variables. If r is large enough, any
(finite order) MA dynamics can be written in the form (2.1)-(2.3) (FGLR, Section 2).
6
Given the non-structural representation Cn(L)vt, the sign restrictions above define an ad-
missible region Θ on the unit sphere, such that for θ ∈ Θ Bn(L) = Cn(L)H(θ) satisfies such
inequalities. Following Uhlig (2005), we assume that the true shocks and impulse-response
functions are associated with a point θ with uniform probability density in the region Θ.
This in turn implies upper and lower bounds and a probability density for each coefficient
of the impulse-response functions Bn(L).
2.3 Estimation
As for estimation, we proceed as follows. First, starting with an estimate rˆ of the number
of static factors, we estimate the static factors themselves by means of the first rˆ ordinary
principal components of the variables in the data set, and the factor loadings by means of
the associated eigenvectors. Precisely, let Γˆx be the sample variance-covariance matrix of
the data: our estimated loading matrix Aˆn = (aˆ
′
1aˆ
′
2 · · · aˆ′n)′ is the n × r matrix having on
the columns the normalized eigenvectors corresponding to the first largest rˆ eigenvalues of
Γˆx, and our estimated factors are f t = Aˆ
′
n(x1tx2t · · ·xnt)′.
Second, we set a number of lags pˆ and run a VAR(pˆ) with f t to get estimates of D(L)
and the residuals t, say Dˆ(L) and ˆt.
Now, let Γˆ be the sample variance-covariance matrix of ˆt. As the third step, having an
estimate qˆ of the number of dynamic factors, we obtain an estimate of a non-structural rep-
resentation of the common components by using the spectral decomposition of Γˆ. Precisely,
let µˆj , j = 1, . . . , qˆ, be the j-th eigenvalue of Γˆ
, in decreasing order, Mˆ the q × q diagonal
matrix with
√
µˆj as its (j, j) entry, Kˆ the r × q matrix with the corresponding normalized
eigenvectors on the columns. Setting Sˆ = KˆMˆ, our estimated matrix of non-structural
impulse response functions is
Cˆn(L) = AˆnDˆ(L)
−1Sˆ. (2.8)
Consistency of the above estimation procedure (as both the cross-sectional and the time
dimension go to infinity) is proven in FGLR.
To account for estimation uncertainty, we adopt the following standard non-overlapping
block bootstrap technique. Let X = [xit] be the T × n matrix of data. Such matrix is
partitioned into S sub-matrices Xs (blocks), s = 1, . . . , S, of dimension τ × n, τ being the
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integer part of T/S.3 An integer hs between 1 and S is drawn randomly with reintroduction
S times to obtain the sequence h1, . . . , hS . A new artificial sample of dimension τS×n is then
generated as X∗ =
[
X ′h1X
′
h2
· · ·X ′hS
]′
and the corresponding impulse-response functions
are estimated. A set of non-structural impulse-response functions is obtained by repeating
drawing and estimation.
Finally, we obtain a distribution of impulse-response functions by imposing our sign
identification restrictions. Precisely, we proceed as follows. For each artificial sample X∗
we compute the corresponding non-structural impulse response functions Cˆn(L). Then
we draw N times a vector of angles θ with dimension w = (q2 − q)/2 from a uniform
distribution in the range 0 ≤ θj < pi, j = 1, . . . , w − 1, 0 ≤ θw < 2pi and retain the related
Bˆn(L) = Cn(L)H(θ) as long as they satisfy the sign restrictions. This gives a distribution of
estimated Bˆn(L)’s. We get a point estimate and the related confidence bands by retaining
the mean along with the relevant percentiles of such a distribution.4
2.4 Discussion
FGLR is a special case of the generalized dynamic factor model proposed by Forni, et al.
(2000, 2004, 2005) and Forni and Lippi (2001, 2008). This model differs from the traditional
dynamic factor model of Sargent and Sims (1977) and Geweke (1977) in that the number
of cross-sectional variables is infinite and the idiosyncratic components are allowed to be
mutually correlated to some extent, along the lines of Chamberlain (1983), Chamberlain
and Rothschild (1983) and Connor and Korajczyk (1988). Closely related models have been
studied by Forni and Reichlin (1998), Stock and Watson (2002a, 2002b, 2005), Bai and Ng
(2002, 2007), Bai (2003) and Bernanke et al. (2005).
Large statistical factor models are compatible with a variety of economic models, in-
cluding both neo-classical and neo-keynesian DSGE models, augmented with measurement
errors (see Sargent and Sims, 1977, Sargent, 1989; Altug, 1989; Ireland, 2004, Giannone et
al., 2006 and the literature mentioned therein). However, in the present work we do not
3Note that τ has to be large enough to retain relevant lagged auto- and cross-covariances In the present
paper we set τ = 19.
4Here we impose an upper bound (10) to the number of impulse-response functions to retain for each
step of the bootstrap procedure in order to avoid that a single bootstrap provide a disproportionately large
number of functions.
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propose a fully developed economic model characterized by “deep” parameters. Rather,
our approach is very much in the spirit of the “structural” VAR literature. Our impulse
response functions can indeed be labeled as “semi-structural”, rather than “structural”:
while not being reduced form coefficients, they are still a mixture of behavioral and policy
parameters, so that we cannot tell, say, what would happen in absence of systematic fiscal
or monetary policy. The results of the present paper should then be interpreted essentially
as stylized facts, conditional on the identified shocks.
Why use a structural factor model rather than a structural VAR? Factor models impose
a considerable amount of structure on the data, implying restricted VAR relations among
variables (see Stock and Watson, 2005 for a comprehensive analysis). In this sense, they
are less general than VAR models. On the other hand, factor models have a few advantages
which may be important in the present context.
First, within a factor model we can study how many shocks there are in the macro
economy, an interesting question which does not even make sense within the statistical VAR
framework, where the number of shocks is necessarily equal to the number of variables that
the econometrician chooses to include in the data set. Determining the number of shocks
is important since it can provide useful guidelines for building macroeconomic models.
Second, being much more parsimonious in terms of parameters, factor models can handle
a much larger amount of information. The data set used here, for instance, includes about
one hundred variables. A VAR model with the same number of series would have too many
parameters to estimate, given the number of observations available in the time dimension.
Having a large data set is important for three reasons. First, we can study the impulse
response functions of virtually all relevant macro variables within a unified framework. We
exploit this opportunity here by showing results for 23 key macro variables.
Second, it enables us to impose identifying restrictions on several variables, reducing the
region of admissible impulse response functions and causing the confidence bands to shrink.
For instance, we identify an expansive demand shock by imposing positive effects on output
and prices; as output series we use both GDP and the industrial production index, while
prices are measured by both the GDP deflator and the CPI.
Last, but not least, large information is likely to produce better results. The relevance
of the information issue is stressed in several influential papers, including Quah (1990),
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Sims (1992), Lippi and Reichlin (1993, 1994), Bernanke and Boivin (1993), Bernanke et
al. (2005). Central Banks, fiscal policy authorities and private economic agents base their
decisions on all of the available macroeconomic information. Hence structural shocks should
be innovations with respect to a large information set, which can hardly be included in a
standard VAR model. If the VAR information set is too poor, the true structural shocks and
the corresponding impulse response functions cannot be obtained from the VAR residuals,
even if the identifying assumptions are correct. As a matter of fact, large dimensional factor
models have proven useful in solving well known VAR puzzles (Bernanke et al., 2005, Forni
and Gambetti, 2010).
3 Empirics I: Identifying the structural shocks
In this section we describe the data, identify the number and the nature of structural
shocks and describe the set of inequality restrictions used to estimate the impulse response
functions.
3.1 Data, data treatment and specification of r
Our data set is made up of 101 US quarterly series, covering the period 1959-I to 2007-IV.
Most series are taken from the FRED data base. A few stock market and leading indicators
are taken from Data Stream. Some series have been constructed by ourselves as transfor-
mations of the original FRED series. The series include both national accounting data like
GDP, investment, consumption and the GDP deflator, which are available only at quarterly
frequency, and series like industrial production indices, CPI, PPI and employment, which
are produced monthly. Monthly data have been temporally aggregated to get quarterly
figures.
As required by the model, the data are transformed to obtain stationarity. Following
Stock and Watson (2005), prices and nominal variables are taken in second differences of
logs, rather than first differences of logs, and interest rates in first differences, rather than in
levels. With these transformations all variables are stationary according to both the ADF
and the KPSS tests.5
5Outliers were detected as values differing from the median more than 6 times the interquartile difference
and replaced with the median of the five previous observations.
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The full list of variables along with the corresponding transformations is reported in the
Appendix.
The number of static factors r was set to 12 by taking the simple average of the popular
tests IC1 (r = 14) and IC2 (r = 10), proposed by Bai and Ng (2002). As a robustness
check, we repeated the analysis below for r = 8 and r = 16 and obtained similar results
(not reported here).
Finally, the number of lags p to include in the VAR which is part of our estimation
procedure was set to 2, the average of AIC (3 lags) and BIC (1 lag).
3.2 The number of shocks and their “demand” or “supply” nature
Determining the number of shocks, besides being a step needed for the specification of our
model, has an intrinsic economic interest. Early real business cycle models assume the
existence of just one supply shock driving economic fluctuations, whereas, on the other
extreme, Smets and Wouters (2007) propose a new Keynesian DSGE model with no less
than ten structural shocks. The fact that economic theories disagree about the number
of shocks driving the economy is partly due to the lack of empirical evidence that can
guide this choice. In the present factor-model framework we have both tests and consistent
information criteria which can provide useful indications for economic modeling.
Table 1 shows the results of the test proposed by Onatski (2009). Each cell reports
the probability value of the null of just k shocks against the alternative of j shocks, with
k + 1 ≤ j ≤ h.6 The null of no shocks (first row) is rejected at the 5% level against all of
the alternatives h = 1, 2, . . . , 7. The same result holds for the null of just one shock (second
row). The null of two shocks is not rejected against the alternative of three shocks, but is
rejected at the 5% level against the alternative of 3 or 4 shocks. The null of three shocks
is rejected at the 5% level against the alternative of 4 shocks. The null of 4 shock is not
rejected against any alternative. These results suggest a four-shock model specification.
The number of shocks can also be determined by a few consistent information criteria.
Here we use three groups of criteria, proposed by Amengual and Watson (2007), Bai and Ng
6The test has two parameters identifying the lower and the upper bound of the frequencies of interest.
Since we are mainly interested in business cycle fluctuations, we set such parameters in such a way as to
include waves of periodicity between 2 and 12 years.
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(2007) and Hallin and Liska (2007). The criterion BˆN
ICP
(yˆA) by Amengual and Watson
gives 6 primitive factors in the ICp1 version and 2 primitive factors in the ICp2 version (with
rˆ = 12 and p = 2). The four criteria of Bai and Ng (2007), namely q1, q2, q3 and q4, give 4,
5, 5 and 4 shocks respectively (with rˆ = 12 and p = 2).7 Finally, the log criterion proposed
by Hallin and Liska gives 2 shocks for all of the proposed penalty functions (independently
of the initial random permutation). In summary, information criteria do not provide a
unique result, the number of shocks being between 2 and 6. Here we conclude in favor of
a four-shock specification, which results from the Onatski tests and is consistent with the
range emerging from available information criteria.
Overall, the above results are in line with what is found by Giannone et al, (2004) with
more informal methods. They are compatible with small scale New-Keynesian models like
Galı´ (1999) or RBC models extended to include other types of shocks in addition to the
technology shock.
Shocks can be classified as either “demand” or “supply”, according to the conditional
correlation of output and prices: an expansionary demand shock raises prices, whereas an
expansionary supply shock reduces prices. This observation is the basis for the following
exercise, which provides some evidence about the nature of the structural shocks.
First, we normalize the sign of all of the shocks by imposing that they have a positive
effect on output. As measures of output we take both GDP and the industrial production
index. Then we require that one shock be “supply” by imposing a negative effect on prices,
and one shock be “demand”, by imposing a positive effect on prices. As measures of
prices we take both the GDP deflator and the consumption price index.8 The effect of the
remaining shocks on prices is left unrestricted. Finally we estimate the model as explained
in Section 2.3 to obtain the impulse response function of prices. We find that both the
average and the median response of both the GDP deflator and the CPI are positive for
both the unrestricted shocks, suggesting that they are demand shocks.
Next, we impose the additional requirement that one out of the two previously unre-
stricted shocks be a demand shock (i.e. has a positive effect on both the GDP deflator and
7The Bai and Ng criteria have two parameters. We set δ = .1 for all criteria and m(q1) = 1.25, m(q2) =
2.5, m(q3) = 2, m(q4) = 4.5. Such values produced good results in our simulations (not shown here).
8All sign restrictions are imposed only on the second-lag coefficient of the impulse response functions, for
reasons that will be clarified below.
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the CPI), so that there are two demand shocks and one supply shock, whereas the fourth
shock is left unrestricted. Again, we find that both the average and the median response of
both the GDP deflator and the CPI are positive for the unrestricted shock, suggesting that
it is a demand shock.
3.3 Identifying restrictions
Although the positive effects on prices are not significant, the above exercise provides some
evidence in favor of a specification with three demand shocks and just one supply shock.
We find particularly appealing a characterization of the demand shocks as “discretionary
fiscal policy”, “discretionary monetary policy” and “private” or “non-policy” demand.
To characterize such shocks we adopt the following definitions. The expansionary mon-
etary policy shock is defined as a shock having a positive effect on both output and prices,
but a negative effect on the federal fund rate. We expect that expansionary monetary policy
will enlarge money aggregates, but prefer not to impose such a restriction as part of the
definition of the shock, in order to keep the definition itself as simple as possible.
An obvious logical implication of the above characterization is that private demand
and fiscal policy do not have a negative effect on the federal fund rate. Despite this, we
do not impose such constraints, since in the present framework imposing a non-negative
effect is equivalent to imposing a significant positive effect, which would be unnecessarily
restrictive. Nonetheless, private demand and fiscal policy are well defined only if their effect
on the federal fund rate is not significantly negative, i.e. is either significantly positive or not
significant. We need to verify whether such condition is satisfied by the estimated impulse
response functions.
The expansionary fiscal policy shock is defined as a shock having a positive effect on
output, prices and the real federal deficit.9 The logical complement of this definition is that
the other demand shocks, or at least expansionary private demand, do not have a significant
positive effect on the federal deficit. Again, we do not impose a non-positive constraint,
since de facto it would rule out a zero effect, which is not inconsistent with our definitions.
We shall verify that private demand and monetary policy do not raise significantly the real
9The real federal deficit is constructed as the difference between current federal expenditures and current
federal receipts, divided by the GDP deflator
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federal deficit, so that our shocks are well defined.
Most of the restrictions above are imposed on the first three coefficients of the impulse
response functions, i.e. on the impact effect as well as the effects delayed by one and two
quarters. However, there are two exceptions. First, we do not impose any restriction on the
impact effects of monetary policy on output and prices. This is because both output and
prices might react to monetary policy with some delay. In the structural VAR literature
such a delayed reaction is commonly assumed to identify monetary policy (see Christiano
et al., 1999 for a review). Second, the positive effects of expansionary fiscal policy on the
federal deficit, output and prices are imposed only on lag 2. The reason is the following.
On the one hand, the effects of fiscal policy decisions on public expenditures or receipts
are often delayed by several months (see e.g. the discussion in Leeper et al., 2008). On
the other hand, the sign and the size of the impact effects of such decisions on output and
prices are not obvious. For instance, consumers might anticipate a larger income in the near
future, but also a reduced public expenditure or higher taxes in the medium run. If public
expenditure is delayed and consumption does not increase on impact, output and prices do
not necessarily increase at lag 0.
Summing up, the supply shock increases GDP and industrial production and reduces
the GDP deflator and the CPI at lags 0, 1 and 2; the private demand shock increases GDP,
industrial production, the GDP deflator and the CPI at lags 0, 1 and 2; the monetary
policy shock reduces the federal fund rate at lags 0, 1 and 2 and increases GDP, industrial
production, the GDP deflator and the CPI at lags 1 and 2; the fiscal policy shock increases
GDP, industrial production, the GDP deflator, the CPI and the real federal deficit at lag 2.
Such constraints are not sufficient per se to guarantee that all shocks are well defined.
In addition we need that (i) the private demand shock does not reduce the federal fund
rate for at least one of the lags 0, 1, 2; (ii) the private demand shock does not increase the
real federal deficit at lag 2; (iii) at least one of the following conditions holds: (iii.1) the
monetary policy shock does not increase the federal deficit at lag 2, (iii.2) the fiscal policy
shock does not reduce the federal fund rate for at least one of the lags 0, 1, 2. Conditions
(i) and (ii) are needed to characterize the private demand shock, whereas condition (iii) is
needed to distinguish monetary from fiscal policy.
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4 Empirics II: Main results
In this section we present our main findings. We begin by showing a few results validating
our identification scheme. Then we show results concerning the size and the timing of the
effects of supply and demand shocks. Finally, we address policy issues and discuss the
effects of demand on productivity.
4.1 Validating the identification of structural shocks
The purpose of this subsection is to validate our identification procedure along two di-
mensions. First, we check whether the inequality restrictions are sufficient to get a full
characterization of the structural shocks, i.e., conditions (i)-(iii) above are satisfied. Sec-
ond, we show that the response of some relevant variables conform to the consensus view.
Figure 1, left column, shows the mean impulse response functions (solid lines) of the
federal funds rate to the four shocks, along with the 68% confidence bands (dotted lines).
The non-policy demand shock generates an immediate and significant positive effect on the
federal funds rate. A similar finding, but with a smaller response in terms of magnitude, is
obtained for the fiscal policy shock. Hence conditions (i) and (iii.2) are satisfied. Moreover,
deficit significantly reduces at all horizons after a non-policy demand shock, thus ensuring
condition (ii), whereas it is essentially unaffected by the monetary policy shock, the effects
being remarkably small and not significant at all horizons, consistently with condition (iii.1)
(Fig. 2). These findings ensure that the identifying restrictions are sufficient for a proper
characterization of the structural shocks.
Next we show the effect of our identified shocks on a few selected variables, in order to
verify whether they conform to some basic features emerging from previous literature and
to gain additional insights about their sources and their nature.
The non-policy demand shock is the only one that affects significantly, on impact, both
new orders and real exports (Fig. 3). While new orders capture mainly the increase in
domestic demand, real exports indicates that the shock is also related to external factors.
The demand shock is the primary source of unexpected change in investment on impact,
explaining almost one half of the forecast error variance at lag 0 (as against 20% of con-
sumption, see Table 3a). This is very much in line with the idea that investment is largely
driven by “animal spirits” (even if the supply component is also important).
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Concerning the supply shock, Figure 3 shows that both the producer price index of
crude materials and the unit labor cost immediately and significantly fall, indicating that
the supply shocks are partly made up of unexpected changes in some key production costs.
Moreover, Figure 9 shows a large and significant positive impact on labor productivity,
in line with the consensus view that supply shocks include an important technological
component.
An expansionary monetary policy shock increases monetary aggregates, as predicted
by the theory of the liquidity effect (the response function of M2 is shown in Figure 1).
Moreover, the impact effects on output and prices are small and not significant, consistently
with the zero identifying restrictions often imposed in the SVAR literature (Fig. 4).
Finally, the fiscal policy shock immediately and significantly increases federal govern-
ment expenditures (Fig. 2). Note also the different reaction of current receipts to fiscal
policy and private demand shocks. While both shocks significantly affect GDP on impact
and the size of the effects are similar (Fig. 4), non-policy demand significantly raises fed-
eral receipts, whereas fiscal policy does not, suggesting the presence of a tax reduction
component compensating for the increase in GDP.
4.2 The relative importance of supply and demand shocks
Table 2 shows the variance decomposition of (the stationary transformation of) some se-
lected series. Columns 2 to 6 report the percentages of variance explained by the monetary
policy shock (MP), the fiscal shock (FS), the supply shock (S), the non-policy demand shock
(D) and the two policy shocks jointly (MP+FS).
Supply shocks explain around 55% of the variance of GDP growth, being slightly more
important for consumption than for investment. Such result is in line with King et al.
(1991). Policy shocks account for about 26% of the variance, while non-policy demand
shocks explain only 18%. The picture however changes substantially when other variables
are considered. Regarding industrial production, for instance, the contribution of supply
reduces to 37%, as against 39% of non-policy demand. This is consistent with the fact
that, as already noted, private-demand shocks primarily concern investment and exports,
which mainly involve goods, rather than services. The importance of demand is even larger
for labor market variables, such as employment, hours worked or the unemployment rate.
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Focusing on employment, for instance, the percentage of variance accounted for by supply
shocks reduces to 35%, while the one accounted for by non-policy demand shocks is raised up
to 42%. Such a large difference between employment and GDP variance decompositions is
probably due to the technology component of supply shocks. While demand affects output
mainly through employment changes, supply largely affects GDP through the important
impact on productivity already noted above.
Tables 3a-3c display the decomposition of the forecast error variance at different hori-
zons. The previous results are confirmed. In particular, supply shocks explain most of
GDP variance, while demand shocks prevail as far as employment is concerned. On impact
(k = 0) such dichotomy is particularly pronounced: supply shocks explain 63% of output as
against 11% of employment, whereas non-policy demand accounts for 58% of employment
but only 13% of output. From Tables 3a-3c it also emerges clearly that, in the long run,
the effects of non-policy demand on all real variables reduce, while the effects of supply
increase, consistently with the consensus view that supply shocks are more persistent.
Considering prices, the bulk of fluctuations in the GDP deflator is accounted for by the
three demand shocks, which, taken together, account for about 70% of the variance of the
two series. The result is confirmed by Tables 3a-3c: demand shocks account for about 68%,
75% and 84% at horizons 0, 4 and 24 quarters, respectively.
Figure 4 plots the impulse response functions of GDP and the GDP deflator to the four
shocks. Several interesting features emerge. First, all of the shocks except monetary policy
affect significantly output on impact. The effect is particularly large for supply shocks.
Second, both fiscal policy and non-policy demand shocks have temporary effects on output,
whereas the supply shock has large and significant permanent effects. Long-run neutrality
of demand on output is consistent with mainstream theory and is adopted as an identifying
assumption in the SVAR literature, starting with the seminal work of Blanchard and Quah
(1989). Third, despite this, demand is not long-run neutral on all real variables, persistency
being particularly pronounced for employment. We will come back to this point below.
Fourth, the GDP deflator significantly increases at all horizons for the three demand shocks
and reduces significantly at all horizons for the supply shock.
To get some additional insights about the relative importance of structural shocks,
Figure 5 and 6 plot the historical decomposition of output growth and inflation. The dotted
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lines refer to the original series, while the solid line refers to the series of inflation generated
using the particular component specified in the title of each panel.10 As noted above,
both demand and supply shocks have an important role in shaping economic fluctuations.
However, their relative importance is not constant over time. In the 70s supply shocks seem
to have a primary role. Actually, they are responsible for the two recessions of 1971 and
1974. Supply appears to be very important also in the last part of the sample, from the
early 90s onward. The 1991 recession, in particular, is mainly attributable to the supply
component. These results are consistent with the narrative literature attributing to supply
factors such as increases in commodity prices the two recessions of the 70s and the recession
of 1991. On the other hand, demand shocks play a relevant role during the 80s. In particular
the recession of the early 80s is attributable to both policy and non-policy demand factors.
As discussed above, demand shocks are by far the primary source of fluctuations in
prices. The last row of Figure 6 shows that demand shocks very well track the series of
inflation, with the exception of the two peaks in inflation dated 1975 and 1979, which
correspond to the two oil shocks and are driven by supply. The left panel of the last row
plots the component of inflation changes obtained using only the fiscal policy and non-policy
demand components. In the first half of the 80s this series lies always above the actual series,
whereas the two series almost exactly overlap when also the monetary policy component is
added (right panel). The monetary policy shock correctly captures the Volcker disinflation
episode, where a strongly anti-inflationary monetary policy stance was adopted to fight
inflation.
In summary, both supply and demand shocks are important sources of macroeconomic
fluctuations, but the relative importance differs substantially for different variables. Supply
prevails for GDP, whereas demand prevails for labor market variables, industrial production
and prices. Demand shocks are less persistent than supply shocks for all real variables.
While being long-run neutral for output, neutrality does not hold for employment. Finally,
policy shocks have sizeable effects on output and prices. In particular the former seems to be
10This component is computed as follows. First, we estimate a non-structural orthogonal representation
for the original data as explained in Section 2. Then we draw randomly the candidate rotation matrices and
retain the impulse response functions satisfying our sign restriction along with the corresponding shocks (we
got about 2000 admissible impulse response functions). Finally we filter each shock with the corresponding
response function to get the component and average across components.
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responsible for the early 80s recession and disinflation. This picture is more complex than
the one emerging from the VAR literature, where the limited dimension makes it difficult
to compare all of the relevant series.
4.3 Macroeconomic policies
This sub-section addresses three key policy questions. First, what and how big are the effects
of monetary and fiscal discretionary policies on GDP and prices? Second, are consumption
and investment crowded out by discretionary fiscal policy? Third, do monetary and fiscal
authorities react systematically to macroeconomic shocks?
Monetary policy and fiscal shocks account for about 9% and 17% of the fluctuations in
GDP, respectively (see Table 2). Fiscal policy shocks are more important in the short run
(25% at k = 0 and 5% at k = 24), while monetary policy shocks produce bigger effects at
long horizons (3% at k = 0 and 9% at k = 24). This is due to the different shape of the
impulse response functions (Fig. 4). On the one hand, the response of GDP to a monetary
policy shock is persistent but has a nearly zero impact effect. On the other hand, the
response to a fiscal fiscal policy shock reaches the maximal level on impact and is relatively
short lived. As far as inflation is concerned, monetary and fiscal policy shocks explain
around 27% and 7% of the volatility of the growth rates of the GDP deflator, respectively.
Percentages are similar at all horizons.
In conclusion, both fiscal and monetary policy have non-negligible effects on output and
prices; fiscal policy seems to be more relevant for output fluctuations, while monetary policy
is dominant for fluctuations in prices.
Figure 7, line 2, plots the impulse response functions of investment, residential invest-
ment and nonresidential investment to a unit variance fiscal policy shock. The responses of
nonresidential and residential investment differ substantially. The former increases signifi-
cantly for the first year (in the long run the point estimate is positive but not significant).
The latter, after a nearly zero initial effect, reduces significantly in the long run. The dif-
ference could be attributable to a different sensitivity of the two types of investment to
the interest rate, which permanently and significantly increases (see below). On aggregate,
investment increases significantly on impact and for the first quarter after the shock, despite
the increase of interest rates.
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Figure 8, line 2, plots the impulse response functions of consumption, durable consump-
tion and nondurable consumption to a unit variance fiscal policy shock. The three responses
have similar shapes, with a positive impact effect, followed by a reduction. The impact ef-
fect is much larger for durables (0.3% as against 0.06%). On aggregate the impact effect
is small (0.1% as compared to 0.3% of investment). All effects are (borderline) significant
only on impact. All of the three responses are very similar, both quantitatively and qualita-
tively, to the corresponding ones of non-policy demand. Such picture is different to that of
Blanchard and Perotti (2002), where consumption is found to considerably increase, but is
also different to those of Ramey and Shapiro (1998) and Ramey (2009), where consumption
is found to significantly fall. The small reaction of nondurable consumption (and hence
aggregate consumption) to both the fiscal policy and the non-policy demand shocks seems
in line with standard permanent income theory, provided that, at least in part, consumers
correctly perceive the increase of income as transitory. The positive sign of the response is
in contrast with theoretical predictions from standard RBC models.
Overall, there is little evidence of crowding-out of private expenditure after a fiscal policy
shock, with the relevant exception of residential investment.
Let us now study whether there is evidence of a systematic monetary and fiscal policy
reacting to our structural shocks.
Let us consider first monetary policy. After both a non-policy demand and a fiscal
policy shock the federal funds rate immediately and permanently increases (Fig. 1). The
effect is significant in both cases, although, from a quantitative point of view, the effect of
the non-policy demand shock is about two times larger than that of fiscal policy. As for
money aggregates, a significant reduction of M2 is found in both cases, the reduction being
particularly large for the non-policy demand shock (Fig. 1). This suggests a very active
countercyclical behavior of monetary policy, which is consistent with standard Taylor rules
implying systematic policy reaction to increases in prices and output.
On the contrary, the federal funds rate responds negatively to the supply shock on
impact, although the effect is not significant. However, the effect becomes positive and
significant after about one year, converging to 0.4% in the long run. Taking as benchmark
a standard Taylor rule, the result indicates that while in the very short run the opposite
effects of output and inflation offset each other, in the long run the effects on inflation
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reduce and the federal funds rate seems to follow the pattern of output.
Let us now come to systematic fiscal policy (Fig. 2). Government spending essentially
does not react to monetary policy and supply shocks, the effect of such shocks being not
significant at any horizon. On the contrary, the non-policy demand shock induces a strong
countercyclical behavior of fiscal authorities. Government spending reduces significantly at
all horizons by about 0.4%. We can get some idea of the effects of such policy by looking at
Table 2. The fraction of variance of GDP growth explained by the non-policy demand shock
(18%) is sizeably smaller than the one of its components: investment (35%), consumption
(19%), and government expenditure (27%). This is attributable to the negative comovement
of private demand components and government spending.
There is little evidence, however, of an active behavior of fiscal authorities on the re-
ceipt side, since current receipts essentially follow GDP changes. Both supply and demand
bring about a significant positive and permanent increase in current receipts which reduces
government deficit.
In summary, the evidence suggests a strong countercyclical systematic response of both
monetary and fiscal authorities to demand shocks. Given that discretionary policy has
sizeable effects on both output and prices, systematic policy could be effective in con-
trolling inflation and reducing output fluctuations arising from non-policy demand. As a
consequence, output fluctuations originated by non-policy demand, which, as documented
above, are fairly small in comparison with supply-driven variations, could be much larger
if systematic policy where not in place. Unfortunately, with the present model we cannot
proceed to evaluate the quantitative importance of stabilization policies, nor we can say
whether the corresponding variance reduction over-compensates for discretionary policies,
which, as we have seen, are non-negligible sources of additional fluctuations.
4.4 Demand shocks and labor productivity
As shown above, the non-policy demand shock does not have permanent effects on GDP.
This however does not mean that demand is long-run neutral, since the private demand
shock has permanent effects on several real variables. In particular, an expansionary shock
increases employment and hours worked and reduces unemployment and the unemployment
rate (the effect on employment is reported in Figure 9). Since output does not increase in
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the long run, labor productivity (non-farm business sector, output per hour of all persons)
significantly decreases (Figure 9). Such an effect is quantitatively important. A unit-
variance shock, increasing GDP by 0.2 per cent on impact, reduces labor productivity by
almost 0.4% in a couple of years: a change which, in absolute value, is even larger than
that of the supply shock. Table 3c confirms such ranking: private demand explains about
45% of the forecast error variance at a six-year horizon, as against the 35% explained by
the supply shock. Moreover, the wage rate (nonfarm business sector, real compensation
per hour) decreases substantially as far as the point estimate is concerned, even though the
effect is not significant, owing to the large confidence bands (not shown).
The findings above, while being at odds with most of the business cycle literature,
are consistent with a stream of empirical and theoretical work concerning the interactions
between growth and cycle. Empirical evidence of a long-run negative effect of a positive
demand shock on productivity is reported in Bean (1990), Saint-Paul (1993) and Galıa´nd
Hammour (1991), where an impulse response function almost identical to the one obtained
here is found by using a structural VAR approach. Possible explanations are provided by
theoretical works which, in various ways, revive the Schumpeterian view of recessions as
providing a cleansing mechanism for reducing organizational inefficiencies and resource mis-
allocations. During recessions, less efficient firms become unprofitable and shut down, thus
improving average productivity (Caballero and Hammour, 1993). Moreover, the opportu-
nity cost of undertaking productivity-enhancing activities are lower, so that recessions are
the right time to reorganize production, and/or improve the matching between workers and
firms, implement new technologies, invest in human capital (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992,
Hall, 1991, Aghion and Saint-Paul, 1991). Such efficiency effects are long-lasting.11
Let us highlight two relevant implications of the above findings. The first one is related
to empirical economic research. A widespread practice in structural VAR literature is to
identify technology shocks as the only ones having long-run effects on productivity (Galı´,
1999, Christiano et al., 2003). But if demand also affects productivity, this identification
assumption may produce a mixture of true positive technology shocks and negative demand
11According to the above explanations, productivity is related to the business cycle, rather than demand
per se). This is consistent with our estimated response of productivity to supply shocks, which reaches its
maximum after about one year and then declines sharply, dissipating about one half of the impact effect in
the following six quarters (see Figure 9).
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shocks, leading to incorrect conclusions. For instance, the finding that technology reduces
hours worked (Galı´, 1999) could be due to the negative demand component. Indeed, our
supply shock have a significant positive impact on hours worked (not shown). Moreover, the
puzzling finding that technology has little effect on investment (Christiano et al., 2003) may
result from positive technology effects canceling out with negative demand effects. Actually
with our identification procedure supply shocks account for about 72% of fluctuations in
investment at the 4-year horizon (see Table 3c).
The second implication is a policy one. Systematic counter-cyclical policies, if successful
in reducing fluctuation, may have long-run ’side effects’. Specifically, expansive measures
following negative demand shocks, while not hurting GDP growth, may permanently sup-
port employment on one hand, and reduce per-capita GDP and real wages, on the other
hand. On balance, such effects are not necessarily undesirable. But policy makers should
be fully aware of the efficiency issues related to public support for employment and shaky
companies, in order to design intervention properly.
5 Conclusions
This paper studies the sources of the business cycle and the role of macroeconomic policies
using a structural factor model. Our main results are the following.
First, theories based on the existence of a single source of fluctuations as well as theories
relying on a large number of shocks are inconsistent with our evidence. The US economy
can be well described by a number of shocks between 2 and 6.
Second, by specifying a four-shock model we find that both demand and supply com-
ponents are important to explain fluctuations in real macroeconomic variables, although
the relative importance varies, depending on the specific variable considered. Supply ex-
plains most of GDP volatility while demand prevails for employment and other labor market
variables. Fluctuations in prices are mostly explained by demand shocks.
Third, policy is important. Discretionary policies produce sizeable effects on output
and prices, with little evidence of crowding out effects of public expenditure. Both fiscal
and monetary authorities follow systematic policy rules reacting mainly to private demand
shocks. Such stabilization policies could in principle be very effective in reducing demand-
driven fluctuations.
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Finally, non-policy demand shocks, while being long run neutral on GDP, have a large
and permanent negative effect on productivity. Such a result is consistent with the Schum-
peterian view of crises as providing a “cleansing” device for reducing inefficiencies and
resource misallocations.
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Appendix: Data
Transformations: 1=levels, 2= first differences of the original series, 5= first differences of
logs of the original series, 5= second differences of logs of the original series.
no.series Transf. Mnemonic Long Label
1 5 GDPC1 Real Gross Domestic Product, 1 Decimal
2 5 GNPC96 Real Gross National Product
3 5 NICUR/GDPDEF National Income/GDPDEF
4 5 DPIC96 Real Disposable Personal Income
5 5 OUTNFB Nonfarm Business Sector: Output
6 5 FINSLC1 Real Final Sales of Domestic Product, 1 Decimal
7 5 FPIC1 Real Private Fixed Investment, 1 Decimal
8 5 PRFIC1 Real Private Residential Fixed Investment, 1 Decimal
9 5 PNFIC1 Real Private Nonresidential Fixed Investment, 1 Decimal
10 5 GPDIC1 Real Gross Private Domestic Investment, 1 Decimal
11 5 PCECC96 Real Personal Consumption Expenditures
12 5 PCNDGC96 Real Personal Consumption Expenditures: Nondurable Goods
13 5 PCDGCC96 Real Personal Consumption Expenditures: Durable Goods
14 5 PCESVC96 Real Personal Consumption Expenditures: Services
15 5 GPSAVE/GDPDEF Gross Private Saving/GDP Deflator
16 5 FGCEC1 Real Federal Consumption Expenditures & Gross Investment, 1 Decimal
17 5 FGEXPND/GDPDEF Federal Government: Current Expenditures/ GDP deflator
18 5 FGRECPT/GDPDEF Federal Government Current Receipts/ GDP deflator
19 2 FGDEF Federal Real Expend-Real Receipts
20 1 CBIC1 Real Change in Private Inventories, 1 Decimal
21 5 EXPGSC1 Real Exports of Goods & Services, 1 Decimal
22 5 IMPGSC1 Real Imports of Goods & Services, 1 Decimal
23 5 CP/GDPDEF Corporate Profits After Tax/GDP deflator
24 5 NFCPATAX/GDPDEF Nonfinancial Corporate Business: Profits After Tax/GDP deflator
25 5 CNCF/GDPDEF Corporate Net Cash Flow/GDP deflator
26 5 DIVIDEND/GDPDEF Net Corporate Dividends/GDP deflator
27 5 HOANBS Nonfarm Business Sector: Hours of All Persons
28 5 OPHNFB Nonfarm Business Sector: Output Per Hour of All Persons
29 5 UNLPNBS Nonfarm Business Sector: Unit Nonlabor Payments
30 5 ULCNFB Nonfarm Business Sector: Unit Labor Cost
31 5 WASCUR/CPI Compensation of Employees: Wages & Salary Accruals/CPI
32 6 COMPNFB Nonfarm Business Sector: Compensation Per Hour
33 5 COMPRNFB Nonfarm Business Sector: Real Compensation Per Hour
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no.series Transf. Mnemonic Long Label
34 6 GDPCTPI Gross Domestic Product: Chain-type Price Index
35 6 GNPCTPI Gross National Product: Chain-type Price Index
36 6 GDPDEF Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deflator
37 6 GNPDEF Gross National Product: Implicit Price Deflator
38 5 INDPRO Industrial Production Index
39 5 IPBUSEQ Industrial Production: Business Equipment
40 5 IPCONGD Industrial Production: Consumer Goods
41 5 IPDCONGD Industrial Production: Durable Consumer Goods
42 5 IPFINAL Industrial Production: Final Products (Market Group)
43 5 IPMAT Industrial Production: Materials
44 5 IPNCONGD Industrial Production: Nondurable Consumer Goods
45 2 AWHMAN Average Weekly Hours: Manufacturing
46 2 AWOTMAN Average Weekly Hours: Overtime: Manufacturing
47 2 CIVPART Civilian Participation Rate
48 5 CLF16OV Civilian Labor Force
49 5 CE16OV Civilian Employment
50 5 USPRIV All Employees: Total Private Industries
51 5 USGOOD All Employees: Goods-Producing Industries
52 5 SRVPRD All Employees: Service-Providing Industries
53 5 UNEMPLOY Unemployed
54 5 UEMPMEAN Average (Mean) Duration of Unemployment
55 2 UNRATE Civilian Unemployment Rate
56 5 HOUST Housing Starts: Total: New Privately Owned Housing Units Started
57 2 FEDFUNDS Effective Federal Funds Rate
58 2 TB3MS 3-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate
59 2 GS1 1-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate
60 2 GS10 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate
61 2 AAA Moody’s Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond Yield
62 2 BAA Moody’s Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond Yield
63 2 MPRIME Bank Prime Loan Rate
64 6 BOGNONBR Non-Borrowed Reserves of Depository Institutions
65 6 TRARR Board of Governors Total Reserves, Adjusted for Changes in Reserve
66 6 BOGAMBSL Board of Governors Monetary Base, Adjusted for Changes in Reserve
67 6 M1SL M1 Money Stock
68 6 M2MSL M2 Minus
69 6 M2SL M2 Money Stock
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no.series Transf. Mnemonic Long Label
70 6 BUSLOANS Commercial and Industrial Loans at All Commercial Banks
71 6 CONSUMER Consumer (Individual) Loans at All Commercial Banks
72 6 LOANINV Total Loans and Investments at All Commercial Banks
73 6 REALLN Real Estate Loans at All Commercial Banks
74 6 TOTALSL Total Consumer Credit Outstanding
75 6 CPIAUCSL Consumer Price Index For All Urban Consumers: All Items
76 6 CPIULFSL Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items Less Food
77 6 CPILEGSL Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items Less Energy
78 6 CPILFESL Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items Less Food & Energy
79 6 CPIENGSL Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Energy
80 6 CPIUFDSL Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Food
81 6 PPICPE Producer Price Index Finished Goods: Capital Equipment
82 6 PPICRM Producer Price Index: Crude Materials for Further Processing
83 6 PPIFCG Producer Price Index: Finished Consumer Goods
84 6 PPIFGS Producer Price Index: Finished Goods
85 6 OILPRICE Spot Oil Price: West Texas Intermediate
86 5 USSHRPRCF US Dow Jones Industrials Share Price Index (EP) NADJ
87 5 US500STK US Standard & Poor’s Index if 500 Common Stocks
88 5 USI62...F US Share Price Index NADJ
89 5 USNOIDN.D US Manufacturers New Orders for Non Defense Capital Goods (BCI 27)
90 5 USCNORCGD US New Orders of Consumer Goods & Materials (BCI 8) CONA
91 1 USNAPMNO US ISM Manufacturers Survey: New Orders Index SADJ
92 5 USVACTOTO US Index of Help Wanted Advertising VOLA
93 5 USCYLEAD US The Conference Board Leading Economic Indicators Index SADJ
94 5 USECRIWLH US Economic Cycle Research Institute Weekly Leading Index
95 2 GS10-FEDFUNDS
96 2 GS1-FEDFUNDS
97 2 BAA-FEDFUNDS
98 5 GEXPND/GDPDEF Government Current Expenditures/ GDP deflator
99 5 GRECPT/GDPDEF Government Current Receipts/ GDP deflator
100 2 GDEF Governnent Real Expend-Real Receipts
101 5 GCEC1 Real Government Consumption Expenditures & Gross Investment, 1 Decimal
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Tables
Table 1:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.006
1 0.012 0.021 0.028 0.036 0.042 0.05
2 0.927 0.107 0.147 0.183 0.215
3 0.06 0.107 0.147 0.183
4 0.852 0.982 0.746
5 0.746 0.595
6 0.336
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Table 2: Explained variances
MP FP S D MP+FP
Variable % var std % var std % var std % var std % var
GDP 8.95 5.78 17.25 9.28 55.81 13.45 17.98 10.63 26.21
Investment 7.75 6.10 9.76 6.52 47.96 14.71 34.54 13.22 17.50
Consumption 10.80 7.38 11.34 7.67 58.56 13.08 19.30 9.73 22.14
Gov. Exp.&Inv. 17.91 17.23 37.77 19.95 17.07 14.38 27.26 18.48 55.68
Deficit 16.40 12.17 19.88 12.19 17.19 9.10 46.53 14.21 36.28
Industrial Production 8.32 6.32 14.98 9.98 37.68 11.74 39.01 12.99 23.30
Employment 11.10 7.57 11.02 8.23 35.23 13.82 42.64 14.51 22.13
Unemployment Rate 7.25 6.22 10.87 6.77 42.20 13.20 39.68 12.95 18.12
Labor Productivity 11.39 8.47 22.05 12.43 51.37 13.52 15.18 5.62 33.44
GDP Deflator 26.80 18.76 7.02 8.56 29.65 16.27 36.53 18.92 33.82
PPI 19.65 13.81 34.68 17.23 29.77 13.92 15.90 12.27 54.33
Federal Funds Rate 18.97 11.70 17.43 10.96 18.73 8.90 44.86 12.05 36.40
New Orders 11.09 7.51 12.12 6.74 32.10 9.75 44.69 11.34 23.22
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Table 3a: Explained forecast error variances at horizon k = 0
MP FP S D MP+FP
Variable % var std % var std % var std % var std % var
GDP 3.23 6.01 19.96 13.84 62.87 18.47 13.93 14.83 23.20
Investment 2.29 4.11 8.71 9.89 41.36 20.93 47.63 22.73 11.01
Consumption 6.91 8.49 9.06 12.01 63.94 20.52 20.09 19.12 15.98
Gov. Exp.&Inv. 16.08 21.18 39.26 25.55 15.53 18.04 29.13 22.21 55.34
Deficit 15.38 16.76 18.71 16.11 7.38 10.98 58.53 20.45 34.10
Industrial Production 4.59 7.50 18.99 16.00 28.11 17.17 48.31 20.73 23.58
Employment 14.88 18.73 15.27 17.54 11.16 12.01 58.69 25.95 30.16
Unemployment Rate 2.24 3.80 13.15 11.45 28.43 16.47 56.18 19.68 15.39
Labor Productivity 7.26 11.45 22.53 16.92 64.90 18.15 5.30 6.08 29.80
GDP Deflator 30.80 23.28 5.77 9.86 32.70 18.04 30.74 21.79 36.57
PPI 16.60 16.21 35.88 22.45 35.53 17.67 12.00 15.24 52.48
Federal Funds Rate 26.93 16.92 19.95 18.70 8.72 10.41 44.40 22.31 46.88
New Orders 7.84 8.89 10.97 12.12 10.22 12.02 70.96 21.43 18.81
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Table 3b: Explained forecast error variances at horizon k = 4
MP FP S D MP+FP
Variable % var std % var std % var std % var std % var
GDP 6.89 7.48 7.39 8.26 73.55 16.81 12.16 13.35 14.28
Investment 7.00 7.88 3.96 4.99 64.97 20.35 24.07 18.18 10.96
Consumption 11.10 10.19 5.29 5.93 76.03 14.52 7.58 8.48 16.39
Gov. Exp.&Inv. 13.17 17.13 41.92 25.29 14.63 15.37 30.29 23.50 55.09
Deficit 10.59 10.69 9.80 9.57 18.36 15.27 61.25 18.95 20.38
Industrial Production 6.18 6.22 7.19 7.76 54.03 18.67 32.60 17.93 13.37
Employment 7.68 7.41 6.68 8.03 38.12 20.57 47.52 21.26 14.36
Unemployment Rate 4.86 5.97 5.35 6.42 54.25 19.89 35.54 19.01 10.21
Labor Productivity 9.52 11.02 11.14 10.97 58.08 16.85 21.26 12.97 20.66
GDP Deflator 27.36 22.22 4.86 8.53 25.70 17.49 42.09 21.33 32.21
PPI 29.26 23.46 34.03 25.49 23.87 18.96 12.84 15.12 63.29
Federal Funds Rate 7.10 6.31 16.27 12.47 10.39 7.69 66.24 14.90 23.37
New Orders 5.65 6.58 4.96 5.40 44.10 20.91 45.29 20.79 10.61
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Table 3c: Explained forecast error variances at horizon k = 24
MP FP S D MP+FP
Variable % var std % var std % var std % var std % var
GDP 8.82 9.64 4.97 6.98 78.61 14.70 7.60 9.03 13.79
Investment 9.34 10.43 5.19 5.77 72.03 18.95 13.44 14.19 14.53
Consumption 12.00 11.44 6.34 7.14 72.15 15.16 9.51 9.37 18.34
Gov. Exp.&Inv. 12.37 17.10 41.08 27.13 19.19 19.82 27.36 24.77 53.45
Deficit 11.85 12.93 15.46 12.94 28.60 20.51 44.08 23.07 27.32
Industrial Production 8.87 8.92 4.77 6.54 67.77 18.72 18.59 16.11 13.64
Employment 9.80 9.72 4.75 5.98 54.82 23.37 30.63 21.38 14.56
Unemployment Rate 7.56 8.95 4.06 5.37 68.82 20.43 19.56 17.26 11.62
Labor Productivity 10.17 12.34 10.49 12.27 34.67 18.61 44.67 19.52 20.66
GDP Deflator 31.30 24.72 4.59 8.86 16.26 17.19 47.85 22.78 35.89
PPI 30.05 25.88 26.47 25.95 31.20 26.60 12.28 13.18 56.52
Federal Funds Rate 5.29 5.61 10.53 10.71 25.37 16.56 58.82 17.95 15.82
New Orders 7.42 9.57 5.60 5.49 60.18 22.28 26.81 20.66 13.02
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